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Introduction  
International and transnational crime perpetrated by organised criminal 
groups poses a significant threat to the Mediterranean region. On a 
global scale organised crime has been estimated to control from two per 
cent to one quarter of the world’s gross domestic product. 1 Whichever 
is more accurate it amounts to a significant portion of world trade.  
Given that organised crime thrives in countries with weak policing 
structures, with significant corruption and money laundering, combined 
with relatively few legitimate economic opportunities for the population 
to engage in -  which describes several nations in the region – it is 
reasonable to assume organised crime also controls a considerable 
proportion of commerce in this region. Their activities range from drug 
trafficking, people smuggling, money laundering, counterfeit goods to 
even supporting terrorist groups.      
 
This paper will seek to provide a brief overview of international and 
transnational crime in the OSCE Mediterranean area. It will begin by 
examining some of the threats posed by organised criminals as well as 
examining some of the characteristics of these groups. The paper will then 
move on to examine some of the responses from the international community, 
particularly those originating from the European Union. In conclusion the 
paper will identify some of the challenges confronting policy-makers.   
 
International Crime in the Euro-Med Region 
 
An examination of international or transnational crime with the European 
region inevitably focuses upon the provision of illegal goods and services 
provided by internationally organised crime groups. The range of transnational 
                                            
1 Zaheed, T. (2004) Transnational Organized Crime: US Policy, Programs, and Related Issue. CRS Report for 
Congress, January 8th, 2004.  
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crimes affecting Europe is shaped principally by the demand Europe has for 
illegal drugs, the significant income inequality within the region and in 
comparison with the developing South, and by Europe’s potential to launder 
the proceeds of crime within its economic and banking systems.  
 
In May 2004 the European Union re-drew the economic and political 
boundaries as ten new member states joined. The EU regards enlargement 
as also providing increased opportunities for organised crime groups seeking 
illicit markets. In addition, a wide range of other factors in the broader region 
of the OSCE are providing a stimulus for transnational crime in developing 
and transitional states, with unstable governments in Albania and South 
Eastern Europe, and with increasing populations, particularly in Northern 
Africa. In short, the EU is a major economic draw for legal and illegal 
migration, for organised smuggling and trafficking of human beings for labour 
markets and for the purposes of sexual exploitation.  
 
These international criminal challenges are accompanied by increased threat 
of political violence. This has had two forms, in the war crimes committed in 
the break up and civil wars within the former Yugoslavia, and secondly the 
terrorism that is evident in the northern Africa and the Middle East, spilling-
over to the wider European domain, as well as the more recent targeting of 
western European countries and their interests by radical Islamic groups. 
Indeed there has been a growing concern that the decrease in state 
sponsorship of terrorism may lead to groups turning to transnational criminals 
for assistance. There is evidence already of terrorist groups making use of 
criminal organisations’ transportation networks to smuggle operatives and 
weapons and fears these may also be used for nuclear weapons grade 
material.2 The recent bombings in Madrid would seem to have been 
perpetrated by extreme Islamic terrorists originating from North Africa, 
illustrating the desire for such groups to operate in the European Union. With 
increasing attention being paid to such groups this may lead to a greater need 
                                            
2 Makarenko, T. (2003) Tracing the Dynamics of the Illicit Arms Trade. Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, September 1, 2003.  
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to use the expertise of organised criminal groups to utilise their smuggling 
networks.  Indeed a recent report argued,  
 
Narcotics traffickers have entered symbiotic relationships with Islamic 
groups in and around the port of Tangiers. Although they remain 
organizationally separate, the traffickers and religious extremists share 
tactics and a deep distrust of the secular government…3    
 
The most recent evidence of trafficking shows an increased diversification of 
organised crime groups from single commodity smuggling to poly-drug 
smuggling (that incidentally reflects greater poly-drug use by consumers) and 
a mix of drug and criminal enterprise activities.4 From these sources we have 
an indicator of illicit drug prevalence, with seizure statistics centering upon a 
small number of countries such as cannabis resin in Spain, Netherlands, 
Morocco and the United Kingdom, where 75% of world seizures are 
concentrated (along with Pakistan). Within Europe, Spain tops Europe’s 
cocaine seizures whilst the Netherlands and the UK head synthetic drug 
seizures. Conclusions need to be qualified, when looking at this enforcement 
data, but examining trade routes highlights how the wider European region is 
embroiled. The North-South cannabis trade ‘axis’ from Morocco to northern 
Europe in intersected by the Balkan heroin trafficking route from the Golden 
Crescent into Europe’s Balkan region via Turkey. Indeed it has been reported 
that 75 per cent of illegal narcotics originate or are transported through 
Turkey.5 The abolition of internal EU border controls has ensured that the free 
intra-community distribution of a burgeoning and diversified synthetic drugs 
market with manufacturing based mainly in the Netherlands and Belgium 
distributed to the wider Europe, along with the distribution of cocaine from 
Spain to the wider European demand countries. The EU’s accession of ten 
                                            
3 Berry, L., Curtis, G., Gibbs, J., N., Hudson, R., A., Karacan, T., Kollars, N. and Miro, R. 
(2003) Nations Hospitable to Organised Crime and Terrorism. Washington DC: Library of 
Congress. p 7.  
4
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new member states brings into the intra-community market established 
synthetic drug producers from Poland, Estonia Lithuania and the Czech 
Republic. 
 
Irregular migration, comprising the smuggling and trafficking of people, has 
provided low risk and high gain opportunities for organised crime groups in 
facilitating entry to the European Union.6 In terms of smuggling and trafficking 
the main difference is the continued exploitation of trafficked people after their 
illegal entry as opposed to the smuggled migrant would not remain under the 
influence of a 'facilitator' once at their destination. Thus payments for the 
services of a smuggled migrant would end with entry to the country, whereas 
trafficked persons would continue to be indebted to the traffickers after entry, 
being in a form of 'debt bondage', providing the basis for ongoing exploitation. 
Those trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation would come into 
regular contact with outsiders via 'clients' whereas those in forced labour 
conditions would tend to be more isolated from the outside world. Quantifying 
the extent of the trafficking phenomena is difficult, with UK estimates being in 
the region of 140-1400 cases per annum.7 Dutch research has shown that the 
trend is increasing substantially in the European region, and that organised 
crime groups are becoming more structurally involved in the trade with the 
Dutch authorities finding that 30% of asylum seekers to the EU used a 
trafficker in 1996, rising to 60-70% by the late 1990s.8  
                                            
6
 Europol (2003a), p 18.  
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 Kelly, L & Regan, L. (2000). Stopping Traffic: Exploring the extent of, and responses to, 
trafficking in women for sexual exploitation in the UK. Home Office Police Research Series 
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The position of organised crime groups within Europe who sate the appetite of 
Europeans for illegal goods and sexual services is mapped by Europol in its 
annual Organised Crime Report.9 In 2003 it was estimated that 4 000 (3000 in 
2002) organised crime groups were operating within the EU with 40 000 (30 
000 in 2002) members. What is clear, is that the traditional hierarchical and 
territorial controlling groups of Sicily (and the perception of the media industry) 
are eclipsed by increasingly professional and technologically sophisticated 
cell-based networks with dynamic but loose affiliations. An ‘enterprise model’ 
of organised crime provides more explanatory use as this ensures cognisance 
of the entrepreneurial dynamics and the interface between legal and illegal 
economies and the laundering of the proceeds of crime into the legitimate 
economies of Europe.    
 
Organised crime in Europe primarily encompasses indigenous crime groups 
but with significant influence from divergent Russian and Nigerian organised 
crime groups. The Russians tend to be strictly hierarchical, with a clear 
division of labour and regulated by high levels of violence, whilst the Nigerians 
are very loosely structured and focused upon trafficking of humans and drugs. 
Within Europe, ethnic ties are strong with the Turkish and ethnic Albanian 
groups being most notable outside the EU Member States. Moroccan 
organised crime groups are of increasing interest, controlling cannabis 
markets through to Spain, Netherlands northern Europe, with a diversification 
of smuggling activities into cigarettes, harder drugs and vehicles.  
 
The collapse of the former Yugoslavia combined with strong family and clan 
ties in the region has created conditions facilitating the expansion of 
organised criminals. The sanctions imposed upon Serbia and Montenegro 
(formerly Yugoslavia) combined with other factors have fuelled a state 
                                            
9
 Europol (2003a). 2003 European Union Organised Crime Report. (Luxembourg: OOPEC). 
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sponsored criminal infra-structure that plundered state assets, aided 
trafficking, illegal exports of arms as well as war crimes.  In Bosnia and 
Herzogovina the main nationalist parties have also funded their political (and 
military) activities largely from smuggling and illegal financial transactions. 
This was exposed in the Autumn of 2002 when aircraft parts produced by the 
Bosnian-Serb owned Orao were delivered to Iraq in contravention of 
international sanctions.  Bosnia is also a significant destination for women 
trafficked from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to supply the 
growing sex industry there.10   
 
Croatia has been implicated in racketeering, drugs trafficking and arms 
smuggling with evidence of corrupt political officials neglecting such crimes as 
a priority. In Kosovo the raison-d’etre of many of the terrorist liberation groups 
are criminal activities. They have been implicated in drugs trafficking, 
particularly heroin from Turkey as well as people smuggling.  Macodonia is 
also important to the heroin route from Turkey into Western Europe and has 
also faced major problems with money laundering by criminal groups.11   
 
Perhaps the biggest growth in organised crime during the last decade, 
however, has emanated from Albania, which could account for 40 per cent of 
the distribution of heroin in Western Europe alone. The clan based 
organisation of these groups combined with a weak state and endemic 
corruption has made them very powerful in this country. There has also been 
evidence of links emerging with the Italian mafia in the trafficking and 
distribution of narcotics. The routes from Albania also supply many women 
from this region for the sex trade fuelled by the limited economic opportunities 
and desire to ‘escape’ to the West. Organised crime also benefited from 
rioting in 1997 in Albania, which ‘liberated’ substantial arms stock piles of the 
government, many eventually finding their way into the illegal arms trade.12   
 
                                            
10  Berry, et al, op cit, p 79.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
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Responding to the threat 
The threat of organised crime has led to a multi-layered response at 
both national, bilateral, European and international levels. It is not 
possible to examine all of these, but some of the more salient 
responses will be explored, particularly those from the European Union.    
The United Nations has pursued a number of initiatives recently to 
tackle organised crime, although its interest dates back to 1950. On the 
15th of November 2000 the UN General Assembly adopted the 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its 
supplementary Protocol against trafficking persons. On May 31st 2001 a 
further Protocol on the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms 
was adopted and a further Protocol on corruption is in the process of 
been drafted.   The G8 group at their summit in 1995 also considered 
the issue of organized crime and set up what was to become known as 
the Lyon Group which made 40 recommendations to tackle such groups 
and close loopholes, which have been largely implemented amongst the 
G8 countries as well as others.    
 
The Council of Europe has also assumed a role in tackling organised crime. 
Numerous treaties have been agreed covering mutual co-operation, 
extradition, mutual legal assistance, the transfer of sentenced prisoners as 
well as the trans-border issues covering organized crime, cybercrime and 
terrorism.  Many of these are now requirement of membership of the 
European Union (EU). Some of the most significant operational developments 
at a European level have emerged from Europol, which will now be 
considered.  
 
Police cooperation between the member states of the EU is directed both at 
the effectiveness of border controls to create a ‘hard outer shell’ and the 
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detection, surveillance and prosecution of transnational offenders. The 
response to international crime within the OSCE region can be seen as a 
developing compact between the EU, its member states and what it terms its 
‘near neighbours’ in eastern and southern Europe.  
 
The EU’s operational capacity in tackling cross-border and organised crime is 
primarily focused upon Europol an international police organisation that 
gained its full operational mandate as recently as January 1st 2003, in the 
aftermath of September 11.13 Europol’s five hundred staff (in 2003) helped to 
ensure it performed five main roles: acting as a central point for EU Member 
State’s exchange of criminal information; operational intelligence analysis 
using a central analytical database; conducting strategic intelligence analysis 
on crime trends; spreading best investigative practice; and finally, supporting 
transnational operations conducted by EU Member States.14 But the 
effectiveness of such a role relies upon national Member States providing the 
operational capacity to affect arrest, etc. This is being extended by a 
developing network of bilateral and multilateral partnerships in the wider 
OSCE region, such as the Baltic Sea Task Force to the north, South-Eastern 
Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) in south eastern Europe and finally the 
Euro-Med partnership in the southern Mediterranean region. This increasingly 
formalised transnational policing network, extending to other justice issues 
including irregular migration and counter-terrorism,15 links the EU to other 
countries in the region (complementing candidates states, Russia, Ukraine, 
etc) as well as to other international organisations such as Interpol and the 
World Customs Organisation. 
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 Council of the EU (2001). Council Decision of 6 December 2001 extending Europol's mandate to deal with the 
serious forms of international crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention. Official Journal, C 362, 1 
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Regional and Domestic Dynamics. (London: Frank Cass Ltd.). 
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The integrity, effectiveness and depth of relations between the countries of 
the OSCE have been dramatically affected by the response to September 
11th. The counter-terror focus has had a clear impact on ‘internal’ EU policing 
and judicial practices with the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant 
abolition extradition between EU member states, and the policing and judicial 
cooperation with the EU-USA agreements on mutual legal assistance and 
extradition.16 These ‘external relations’ of the EU were given added impetus 
after September 11th as the EU was provided with its ‘first truly ‘cross-pillar’ 
test of the Union’s role as a security actor’.17 Here it was seen that effective 
counter terrorist cooperation was not just a policing matter, but also included 
coherent action on the economic, political, diplomatic and military fronts.  
 
The 11 March 2004 bombings in Madrid underlined the key need to realise 
the solemn political commitments and practically deepen operational 
cooperation within and between the EU and its near neighbours in the region, 
particularly in North Africa, with EU foreign minters coming to the view that aid 
and trade links needed to deployed as levers to oblige cooperation on the ‘war 
on terror’.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Organised crime poses a growing challenge to countries in the 
Mediterranean region. Drug trafficking, people smuggling, money 
laundering, counterfeit goods and a growing threat of a terrorism -  
                                            
16
 Council of the EU (2003). Op cit; and Norman, P. (2004, in press). European Policing 
Strategies and Transnational Crime. In J. Sheptycki & A. Wardak, (Eds). Transnational and 
Comparative Criminology. (Cavendish Publishing Ltd) 
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the EU as a Security Actor. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (Supplement 1), 11-28. 
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organised  crime nexus are all significant risks. A range of strategies 
have been pursued to combat these strategies at varying levels. Central 
to these have been the emerging European policing strategies against 
transnational and organised crime. The period after September 11th can 
be seen as a period substantial institutional and legislative development 
within the European Union. Prior to September 11th the pace of 
harmonisation and integration between criminal police and judicial 
authorities in general was slow. It was also clear that the EU policing 
strategies could not be effective in tackling transnational offending into 
the Union, if Europol’s reach could not be developed to other third 
countries and major international criminal justice organisations. The 
EU’s developing ‘external relations’ strategy in justice and home affairs 
has now deepened significantly with the USA with agreement on mutual 
stationing of liaison officers, an extradition agreement, mutual legal 
assistance agreement and the USA’s prospective involvement the 
operational Joint Investigation Teams. The contemporary EU-USA 
criminal police and judicial relationship can be regarded as one 
indicative thread of the web of global relationships that will be required 
to attain effective EU policing strategies against transnational and 
organised crime – the challenge for Europe is to extend these 
relationships across a very diverse and in many ways divided OSCE 
region. The threats from drug trafficking and terrorism from North Africa 
pose significant challenges, while the political instability in the Balkans 
also requires further investment in the policing infra-structure to 
adequately address the threat from this region.  
 
 
